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In the aftermath of the bursting of Japan’s “Bubble” economy and the 
subsequent banking crisis of 1997, we find it is possible to have “too few 
lawyers”. The decline of extra-legal resolution of financial distress via 
banks’ suspension of banking transactions leads to an increase in yakuza 
numbers as “dark side” private ordering increases and there is an increase in 
loss-making “zombie” firms. Japanese legal reforms in 2002 lead to a 
significant increase in lawyer numbers. These new lawyers play an 
economically significant role in reducing the number of “zombie” firms in 
Japan and the yakuza’s involvement in civil disputes. Using a panel of 47 
prefectures we find new lawyers lead to a rise in the dissolution and 
liquidation of firms and a reduction in the number of loss-making “zombie” 
firms, as well as a reduction in crimes associated with yakuza involvement in 
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“Let’s kill all the lawyers!” Shakespeare Henry VI Part 2, Act IV Scene 2 
I. Introduction 
Anti-lawyer sentiment pervades modern popular culture: “What do you call a thousand lawyers at the 
bottom of the ocean?” “A good start” (the 1993 movie Philadelphia). The sentiment expressed in 
these lines can be found in many other jokes about lawyers: They reflect a view that lawyers engage 
in vexatious litigation and are rent seekers. In this paper we ask the question: “Is it possible to have 
too few lawyers?” We conclude that it is possible to have too few lawyers and the effects are 
economically harmful as the lack of legal services impairs the resolution of financial distress.  
Many authors have emphasised the importance of strong institutions in generating economic growth, 
notably North 1990. Acemoglu and et al. (2002) have shown the importance of institutions – such as 
the rule of law – while Rodrik et al. (2004) have shown the primacy of institutions over geography 
and trade. The idea that the rule of law, with protection for property rights and contracts, is desirable 
for economic growth is well established (Dam 2007; Acemoglu et al. 2001; 2005). However, how the 
legal system affects growth in advanced economies has been a topic of debate amongst economists 
and lawyers for at least three decades – with Magee et al (1989) building on the work of Olson (1982) 
suggesting that the effect of rent seeking lawyers is bad for growth.  
In the US even lawyers themselves believe that there is an excess of lawyers: a 2015 survey of 320 
managing partners at US law firms by consultancy firm Altman Weil indicated that 60% of the law 
firms believed that overcapacity was making their firms less profitable
1
. Law School Transparency, a 
non-profit organisation dedicated to data transparency, recorded that of the US Law Schools class of 
2013 just 57% found employment full time, long term legal jobs, the number falling to 55.3% if we 
exclude jobs funded by the law schools themselves.  
The academic literature on the optimal number of lawyers is limited and dates back to the 1990s. 
Magee (1992) suggests that the US suffers a loss of US$220 billion due to excessive numbers of 
lawyers
2
. Yet other scholars emphasise the importance of lawyers in generating growth. Epp (1992) 
maintains that there is a positive relationship between the number of lawyers and economic growth 
and Cross (1992) found no evidence for a declining relationship between growth and the number of 
lawyers. Gilson (1992) points to the important microeconomic foundation missing from the work of 
Magee, Epp and Cross: What role is played by lawyers? Murphy et al. (1991) define roles as either 
entrepreneurial or rent seeking and show that countries with a higher proportion of engineering majors 
grow faster than those with a higher proportion of law concentrators. However, are lawyers always 
rent seekers? Gilson suggests that there are cases where lawyers may play roles that are not rent 
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 Kitroeff (2015) 
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 According to Magee (1992), the optimum number of lawyers is 1,370 per million or one per 730 persons 
seeking and instead help to smooth commercial transactions. Our study provides evidence for this 
view: Lawyers are an essential element in ensuring economic growth. 
Hitherto, scholars have mostly focused on situations characterised by a surfeit of lawyers and have 
paid scant attention to advanced economies with too few lawyers. Is it possible for advanced 
economies to have too few lawyers? And what are the consequences of a scarcity of lawyers? We use 
Japan as a case study to explore this question as it has very few lawyers relative to the population and 
goes through a disruptive change in the availability of alternative (extra-legal) methods of resolution 
of financial distress. 
We believe that Japan offers a unique opportunity to design a quasi-natural experiment to investigate 
this issue. Japan underwent a radical reform of its legal system in 2002, which led to a dramatic rise in 
the number of lawyers, with an effective doubling of numbers within a decade. The reforms gave 
appearance rights to judicial scriveners (shiho shoshi) and an increased rate of new attorney 
qualification. In this paper, we use the word “lawyer” to cover both Bar qualified attorneys (bengoshi) 
and judicial scriveners (shiho shoshi) with court appearance rights.  
We use a diff-in-diff pre- and post- the reform methodology. Our analysis uses OLS panel data 
regressions of the 47 prefectures of Japan, using the lagged year-on-year changes in the number of 
lawyers to explain changes in the resolution of financial distress and reductions in the number of 
“zombie” firms and reductions in crimes associated with yakuza involvement in civil dispute 
resolution. The one-off effect of permitting judicial scriveners to represent clients in summary courts 
is estimated to increase the legal resolution of financially distressed firms by approximately 20% or 
approximately 3,000 firms. Our results are statistically and economically significant and robust to 
alternative specifications that include changes in bank lending and the number of police. 
Our study focuses on the resolution of financial distress of Japanese firms after the bursting of the 
Japanese “Bubble” economy and the onset of the Japanese financial crisis in 1997. There are three 
ways in which financial distress is resolved in Japan: 1) Through litigation and renegotiation via 
lawyers as intermediaries; 2) Through the extra-legal means of banks suspending transactions; 3) 
Through “dark side” private ordering, with yakuza (Japanese organized crime) as intermediaries. The 
bursting of the “Bubble” leads to financial distress at banks, which together with structural changes in 
the role of notes payable in inter-firm credit, appears to have resulted in a steep decline of 2) the 
suspension of bank transactions, the extra-legal, but not “dark side” resolution of financial distress. 
This leads to a rise in 3), with a sustained rise in the number of yakuza between 1997 and 2003. 
However, while yakuza may have resolved financial distress in some cases, in others it is likely that 
the yakuza extended financial distress and preyed on creditors and debtors. It seems likely that the 
threat of yakuza involvement decreases the rate of resolution of financial distress and contributes to 
the creation of “zombie” firms. The creation of “zombie” firms has previously been linked to 
forbearance by Japanese banks, see Caballero et al. (2008) and Peek and Rosengren (2005), our 
analysis suggests that there is another channel for the creation and dissolution of “zombies”: The 
availability of legal representation.  
This paper is organised into five sections: I) Introduction; II) The Japanese legal system and reform; 
III) Methodology and data; IV) Results, alternative hypotheses and robustness ;V) Conclusion.  
 
II. The Japanese legal system and the need for reform 
Japan operates a Civil Code legal system based on the German code. It is a unitary state meaning that 
the 47 prefectures are subject to the same laws and institutions. There are several tiers to the Japanese 
court system. At the lowest level, and perhaps most important for our purposes, are Summary Courts. 
There are 438 Summary Courts, each with a single judge. The Summary Courts are for civil cases for 
monetary claims of less than Y1,400,000 (US$12,850) – this was Y900,000 (US$8,250) until 2003. 
There are also special procedures for single day court cases for small claims of less than Y600,000 
(US$5,500). The Summary Court is the level at which judicial scriveners gain appearance rights. 
There are a further 50 district courts, with a further 203 branch offices. These courts handle most 
other first instance cases.  
Japan has historically had a low level of litigation and very few lawyers. Table I shows the relative 
number of bar qualified attorneys in Japan and other major developed countries. In 2002, Japan had 
one lawyer for every 6,752 people and the US had one lawyer for every 284 people
3
, meaning that the 
US has 1,049,751 lawyers for a population of 287 million, whilst Japan had a mere 18,838 for a 
population of 127 million. There are several competing views about the relatively low level of 
litigation. A traditional view from Kawashima (1967) suggests that Japanese were culturally loath to 
litigate, due to concerns about consensus and harmony. Haley (1978) suggests that the Japanese are 
happy to litigate, but were limited due to capacity constraints, costs and a lack of suitable remedies. 
Ramseyer (1988) and Ramseyer and Nakazato (1989) suggest that Japanese litigants are rational and 
once courts resolve legal uncertainties, rather than litigate Japanese choose to settle along the lines of 
the precedents set by the courts, so the Japanese are rational litigants rather than reluctant. Ginsburg 
and Hoetker (2006) find evidence for capacity constraints in explaining the rise in litigation between 
1986 and 2002, with increasing numbers of lawyers and judges being statistically significant and 
accounting for around 50-55% of the total rise in litigation.  
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 This is based on the number of qualified attorneys in each country. It should be noted that the number of 
people undertaking “legal” duties in Japan who are not qualified attorneys is substantially higher and many of 
those who perform the same roles in other countries are qualified attorneys.  See Ramseyer (1986). 
Table I: Number of persons per lawyer in major developed countries 
  2002 2013 Change 
Japan (attorneys only) 6752 3786 -43.9% 
US 284 269 -5.3% 
UK 593 430 -27.5% 
Germany 707 509 -28.0% 
France 1827 1165 -36.2% 
Source: Japan Federation of Bar Associations White Paper on Lawyers 2009 and 2013 
 
 
The relative dearth of lawyers has led to alternative dispute resolution mechanisms such as the 
involvement of organised crime, the yakuza or Japanese mafia. Milhaupt and West (2000) show that 
the yakuza are involved in dispute resolution; offering alternative payment mechanisms and at prices 
competitive with lawyers (see also Hill 2003; Varese 2014). The dispute resolution services offered 
by yakuza are not always optimal however. The Japanese National Police Agency strongly 
discourages the use of yakuza in dispute resolution, claiming that the yakuza will only take advantage 
of disputants. The involvement of yakuza in civil disputes is known as Minji boryoku kainyu 
(Racketeering through intercession in civil disputes). 
There is substantial field evidence that the yakuza are involved in civil disputes. In the 1989 Police 
White Paper, the police estimated that 7.3% of yakuza income came from civil disputes. Hill (2003) 
explains how seiriya (specialists in the management of financial distress) can maximise their returns, 
with the seiriya identifying financially distressed firms at the point of collapse and lending short term 
financial support. From this position of strength the seiriya then force managers to hand over binding 
powers of attorney and use this to further entrench the seiriya’s claims.  
The involvement of yakuza in civil disputes over debts has several consequences. Some of the 
intercessions by yakuza should lead to criminal complaints in the form of recorded crimes such as 
extortion and intimidation. Small firms that are insolvent may not be wound up as the yakuza threaten 
the owners and attempt to continue to extort money on outstanding debts even though the firm is no 
longer viable. Alternatively, firms that owe money on outstanding debts may be protected by yakuza 
keen to preserve the value of other claims. This form of forbearance is not due to banks unwilling to 
force borrowers into bankruptcy due to worries about their own solvency, but instead is due to the 
chilling effect of yakuza in debt disputes
4
.  
                                                          
4
 We find some evidence for yakuza related crimes leading a decline in liquidations (seisan) prior to the legal 
reform, this can be found in table B in the appendix. 
The lack of lawyers to resolve financial disputes may explain a reversal between 1997 and 2004 in the 
long term trend of declining yakuza numbers. Yakuza numbers peaked nationally in 1963 at 184,091 
and have been in a long term downward trend since this peak. Although there is a small uptick 
between 1987 and 1991, the rise between 1997 and 2004 is far larger in absolute and percentage 
terms. The rise in yakuza occurs even as police numbers increase dramatically. Yakuza numbers 
appear to decline after the legal reforms increase the number of lawyers.  
 
 
Figure I: National yakuza and police numbers 
 
Source: National Police Agency 
  
 
 
 
Legal reforms 
Prior to 1990, Japan qualified about 500 attorneys per year, with a pass rate of 2% in the extremely 
competitive Bar examinations. Only bar qualified attorneys had the right to represent clients in court 
cases. The first phase of reforms beginning in the 1990s saw the qualifying numbers rise to 1,000 by 
1999. By 2002 sufficient political pressure for a cheaper and more flexible legal system resulted in 
two major changes. For lawyers the Koizumi government passed the Act on Education in Law School 
and Connection with the Bar Examination in 2002. This law led to the creation of law schools from 
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 2004 along the lines of the US model. Pass rates for the Bar examinations rose, albeit at rates 
lower than were originally foreseen by the reforms. The Judicial Scriveners Act reform of 2002 led to 
a shift in the status of judicial scriveners. From April 2003, judicial scriveners who pass a training 
course given by the Ministry of Justice are permitted to represent clients in Summary Courts and are 
recognised as legal professionals able to settle, negotiate or mediate in disputes where the value of the 
claim is less than the amount subject to Summary Courts.  
In 2002 there are 18,838 attorneys in Japan; this number rises to 33,624 attorneys in 2013. There were 
also 14,483 scriveners able to represent clients in court in 2013. This effectively increased the number 
of lawyers who could litigate smaller claims by 43% and the number of new attorneys plus the 
judicial scriveners relative to the number of attorneys in 2002 means that lawyers increase by 159% in 
10 years.  
Japan still has far fewer lawyers than other developed countries, as can be seen from the 2013 number 
of lawyers per person in table I, but the effect of the reforms is especially great in that prior to the 
reforms many isolated parts of rural Japan lacked lawyers who could represent clients in court. In 
2002 there were 61 District Court sub-districts (Chihousaibansho shibu) out of 203 that had one or 
zero lawyers, by 2011 this had declined to 2 districts. In the 10 years between 2002 and 2013, overall 
attorney numbers increased by 80%. The representation rights given to judicial scriveners also 
mitigate the rural problem. Judicial scriveners have always been far more geographically evenly 
spread than attorneys, who tend to congregate in the four major urban centres of Japan: Tokyo, 
Yokohama (Kanagawa Prefecture), Osaka and Nagoya (Aichi Prefecture), where the number of 
attorneys exceeds the number of judicial scriveners.  
The judicial scriveners are an important component of the legal reform. In 2010, the scriveners 
represent more than 125,000 applicants in Summary Courts, although there is a similar rise for 
lawyers, who go from representing 10,579 applicants in 2002 to 108,738 applicants in 2010. The vast 
majority of the litigation claims in Summary Court are debt related. It is notable that while there is a 
rise in the number of civil litigation cases at the District Court level, it is an order of magnitude less 
than the rise in Summary Court cases
5
.  
We can see from table III that the number of first instance litigation cases in Summary Courts rises 
from 314,000 in 2002 to 624,000 in 2010 and the number of cases where there is a lawyer involved, 
either an attorney or judicial scrivener, rises from under 30,000 to 274,000 over the same time period.  
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 District Court civil litigation rose from 181,207 cases in 2002 to 258,330 
Table II: Number of lawyers and judicial scriveners 
 Lawyers Judicial Scriveners Scriveners with 
appearance rights before 
Summary Courts 
1998 16,305 16,981 
 1999 16,731 16,983 
 2000 17,126 17,034 
 2001 18,243 17,075 
 2002 18,838 17,097 
 2003 19,508 17,304 
 2004 20,224 17,667 6,351 
2005 21,185 17,735 8,462 
2006 22,021 18,059 9,242 
2007 23,119 18,520 9,986 
2008 25,041 18,877 10,880 
2009 26,930 19,394 11,674 
2010 28,789 19,766 12,415 
2011 30,485 20,313 13,258 
2012 32,088 20,670 13,898 
2013 33,624 20,979 14,483 
Source: Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Japan Association of Shiho Shoshi Associations 
 
Figure II: Judicial scriveners with appearance rights legal actions via court and through arbitration 
 Source: Japan Association of Shiho Shoshi Associations 
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The major increase in cases in the Summary Courts comes from cases where the applicant hires a 
lawyer with applicants hiring both attorneys and judicial scriveners. The number of pro se litigants is 
relatively stable during the period analysed. Between 2002 and 2010, there is an increase of 223,000 
cases where the applicants hire a legal representative.  
Figure II shows that even after the peak of litigation passes with the global financial crisis in 2009, the 
level of judicial scrivener arbitration remains at a high level and substantially higher than the level of 
litigation at its peak.  
 
  
Table III: First instance litigation cases before the Summary Court by type of representative (lawyers, judicial scriveners and Pro Se (in person)) 
 Total Any legal 
counsel 
Both 
lawyers 
Applicant 
lawyer 
respondent 
scrivener 
Applicant 
scrivener 
respondent 
lawyer 
Both 
scrivener 
Applicant 
lawyer 
Applicant 
scrivener 
Respondent 
lawyer 
Respondent 
scrivener 
Pro Se 
2000 301,185 31,281 4,034 
   
10,409 
 
16,838 
 
269,904 
2001 303,927 30,908 3,688 
   
10,368 
 
16,837 
 
273,019 
2002 314,623 29,534 3,768 
   
10,579 
 
15,187 
 
285,069 
2003 337,076 30,863 3,703 12 36 4 11,483 1,207 14,180 238 306,213 
2004 347,851 43,796 4,434 120 459 75 15,064 8,883 13,561 1,200 304,055 
2005 356,718 57,883 5,889 172 806 107 20,029 16,747 12,760 1,373 298,835 
2006 386,833 78,243 7,381 194 1,211 101 28,162 28,905 10,850 1,439 308,590 
2007 461,128 133,395 8,855 212 1,804 98 50,607 58,202 11,587 2,030 327,733 
2008 537,626 168,087 9,940 171 2,073 78 65,101 73,561 14,311 2,852 369,539 
2009 622,492 225,248 10,356 242 1,665 156 83,725 108,567 16,625 3,912 397,244 
2010 624,443 274,045 11,898 244 2,021 296 108,738 125,028 21,147 4,673 350,398 
2011 550,798 226,431 13,066 251 2,168 205 89,586 99,441 17,734 3,980 324,367 
2012 424,368 137,673 14,774 267 1,808 178 52,953 48,071 15,905 3,717 286,695 
2013 345,331 104,968 15,337 271 1,318 101 38,038 31,845 14,903 3,155 240,363 
Source: Supreme Court of Japan 
 
Forms of corporate failure 
There are multiple ways in which a Japanese firm can legally fail or restructure. The widest possible 
definition is dissolution (kaisan), which is an aggregate measure of firm failure. It includes all firms 
that enter bankruptcy (hasan), liquidation (seisan), and special liquidation (tokubetsu seisan), it is the 
first step taken in terms of registration. Dissolution (kaisan) itself is not a way to restructure debts, but 
is an action that must be registered with the Ministry of Justice indicating that the firm is to be 
dissolved. If the firm is not involved in a formal bankruptcy (hasan) proceeding, a liquidator 
(seisanin) must be appointed if the firm has debts and the firm must go through either liquidation 
(seisan) or special liquidation (tokubestu seisan). The forms of corporate restructuring include 
corporate arrangement (seiri) and corporate reorganization (kaisha kosei).  
Bankruptcy (hasan) involves substantial court proceedings. Bankruptcy expenses are substantial and a 
court appointed trustee controls assets. In general bankruptcy already has substantial lawyer 
involvement pre-reform. Liquidation (seisan) is a private process and does not involve the courts. The 
person selected by the shareholders as liquidator retains control over the assets of the firm. The 
liquidator can be (but is not required to be) a lawyer. Special liquidation (tokubestu seisan) is a court 
ordered version of private liquidation and follows a similar pattern to liquidation. The liquidator in 
special liquidation must report not only to the creditors’ committee but also to the court. The court 
supervises the liquidator.  
Table IV shows the relative frequency of the different forms of failure and reorganisation in 2002. 
The rate of reorganizations can be seen to be very minor as is the rate of special liquidations. The two 
major forms of corporate failure are bankruptcy and liquidation, covered by the overarching 
registration of dissolution. We thus focus on dissolution, bankruptcy and liquidation in this paper.  
 
 
 
Table IV: Registrations for different forms of firm failure and reorganization in 2002 
 Total 
Dissolution (kaisan) 20,998 
Bankruptcy (hasan) 13,357 
Liquidation (seisan) 17,167 
Special liquidation (tokubetsu seisan) 608 
Corporate reorganization (kaisah kosei)  436 
Corporate arrangement (seiri) 69 
Source: Ministry of Justice 
 
The aftermath of the bursting of the “Bubble” economy and “Zombie” firms 
The Japanese economy slowed dramatically in the 1990s as a major property “bubble” deflated, the 
value of land in Japan fell 47% between 1990 and 2005
6
. Japanese banks suffered significant bad 
loans as the economy slowed. The bad debts of Japanese banks and their effective insolvency was a 
prime reason for the rise of listed “zombie” firms, as shown in Caballero et al. (2008) and Peek and 
Rosengren (2005). The effect was significant for unlisted firms as well.  
We use the number of loss making firms for tax purposes as a proxy for “zombies”. The number and 
proportion of loss makers increased during the 1990s, see figure III. This is an imperfect measure 
since this data is based on tax agency data. Many small firms are loss-making for tax purposes, but 
are, in reality, economically healthy. Japanese small firms with capital of less than ¥100 million 
(approximately US$1 million) are permitted to “expense” up to ¥8 million (approximately 
US$80,000) on entertainment allowances – food and drink for directors, employees and their family 
members. We thus find that many small firms are loss making for tax purposes because the profits are, 
quite literally, consumed by the employees and directors of the firm. However, the spike in loss 
making firms that occurs in the 1990s is accompanied by a dramatic rise in the size of the losses per 
loss making firm, which declines between 2000 and 2012 seen in figure IV. The rise in loss-making 
firms losing more than the entertainment allowance can be seen as our proxy “zombie” firms.   
Historically Japanese firms fail when banks suspend banking transactions when the firm defaulted on 
two promissory notes (or cheques) within six months
7
. This extra-legal enforcement system is 
discussed in Matsumura and Ryser (1995). In 1993, according to Matsumura and Ryser (1995), 87.8% 
of failures of firms with shareholder’s capital of more than ¥10 million (approximately US$100,000) 
suffered from the suspension of bank transactions. Over time the importance of suspension of banking 
transactions declines. In 1965, there were 197,743 cases of bank transaction suspension. In 1980, 
there were 62,766 cases. In 1990 at the height of the Japanese “Bubble” economy, there were 10,083 
cases. In 2000 there were a mere 16,268. Figure V shows the decline of cases of bank suspension and 
the gradual rise of bankruptcies, with the two inverting in 1997. There are two reasons why the 
suspension of bank transactions ceases to be as significant as more formal legal bankruptcies. Firstly 
we can see in figure VI that the importance of notes payable declines steeply during the 1990s – the 
value of notes payable cleared at the clearing houses annually declines to less than 150% of GDP in 
2002 having been as high as 11 times GDP in 1990 and steady at 400% of GDP during the 1960s and 
1970s. Secondly, the financial distress of banks appears to have led to a failure of the old suspension 
of bank transactions mechanism to force financially troubled firms into bankruptcy.   
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 Data taken from supporting tables of the National Accounts at the Japanese Cabinet Office. 
7
 Tokyo Clearing House Rules: Chapter 4 Sections 62-71. 
Figure III: Percentage of loss making to profitable firms in Japan 1951-2013 
 Source: National Tax Agency 
 
Figure IV: Loss per loss-making firm in real terms (deflated to year 2000 Yen) 1960-2013 
 
Source: National Tax Agency 
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 Figure V: Corporate bankruptcies and bank suspension of transactions 1965-2012 
     Sources: Tokyo Shoko Research and Japan Federation of Bankers’ Associations 
 
Figure VI: Annual notes payable cleared in absolute annual value terms and relative to GDP 
 
     Sources: Japan Federation of Bankers’ Associations and Cabinet Office 
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The rise in legal cases before the Summary Court and the District Court in Japan are primarily driven 
by cases associated with litigation for claims related to debts. Note that dissolutions and bankruptcies 
occur mainly to incorporated firms, whilst the suspension of bank transactions would also include sole 
trader unincorporated firms.  
 
III. Methodology and data 
We use a panel regression on the 47 prefectures of Japan over the period 1999-2012. We divide the 
period into two – prior to the deregulation and post the deregulation. We designate 2004 as the year 
that deregulation takes effect, based on the measurable rise in the number of judicial scriveners that 
gain appearance rights in this year, the change in bar attorney qualification requirements, and a panel 
regression that shows the one-off effect of scriveners is statistically significant in this year. We use 
panel OLS regressions with fixed effects by prefecture. All regressions include year fixed effects and 
use robust standard errors. We use both the number of lawyers (attorneys + judicial scriveners) per 
head in each prefecture and the year-on-year change in the number of lawyers per head of population 
as the primary explanatory variable. Ideally we would have the number of judicial scriveners with 
appearance rights before Summary Courts, but this data is not available on a prefectural basis. 
However, the number of new scriveners should be correlated with scriveners with appearance rights 
and the extra noise associated with this measure only strengthens any results found.  
The economic data on prefectures is taken from the Cabinet Office. Data on population is taken from 
The National Institute of Population and Social Security Research. Data on the number of attorneys is 
from the Japan Association of Bar Associations and data on the number of judicial scriveners is from 
the Japan Federation of Shiho Shoshi Associations. Data on the number of police is taken from 
National Police Agency White Paper on Police. Data on crimes committed by prefecture is taken from 
the National Police Agency. Data on the number of loss making firms is taken from National Tax 
Agency. Data on the number of yakuza is taken from Jitsuwa Documento (2005a, b), which is taken 
from prefectural police force statements on the number of yakuza. Data on the number of firms that 
register for dissolution, bankruptcy or liquidation are taken from the Ministry of Justice. Note that we 
focus on Kabushiki Kaisha (stock company), the primary corporate structure with limited liability in 
Japan for the Ministry of Justice registration data.  
 
Hypotheses 
As the legal changes represent a series of different reforms, our hypotheses need to be layered as well. 
Firstly, we expect to find that there will be a one-off increase in corporate dissolutions and 
liquidations when the scriveners are granted appearance rights. If the increase in “zombie” firms is 
due to a lack of legal representation, we would expect to find that the availability of new 
representation should lead to a rise in corporate failures. Of the various different forms of failure, we 
expect liquidations to increase the most since they do not require attorneys or significant court 
oversight. The effect of giving scriveners appearance rights before the courts should continue to have 
an effect, but it should not be as significant as the first year when the backlog is cleared. This also 
determines the year in which the legal reforms gain traction and drive corporate failures.  
 
Hypothesis 1: The impact of giving scriveners appearance rights will result in a one-off increase in 
corporate failures.  
 
Secondly, we expect that there should be a marginal effect on the rate of change of corporate failures 
with each new lawyer (scrivener or attorney) qualified in a prefecture. We expect that post-reform, 
new lawyers in a prefecture will cause firms that are financially distressed to fail, increasing 
dissolutions. The new lawyers engage in litigation for claims, forcing financially distressed firms to 
fail and we expect that the availability of lawyers will help firms to file for dissolution.  
 
Hypothesis 2: An increase in lawyers post-reform will increase firm dissolutions 
 
We expect the effect of new lawyers to be more significant for liquidation (seisan), since firms that 
are large enough to qualify for bankruptcy (hasan) and its associated costs are more likely to have 
found lawyers prior to the reform. We also assume that yakuza intervention, that prevents “zombie” 
firms failing, is less likely for larger firms that are able to pay for bankruptcy.  
 
Hypothesis 2a: An increase in lawyers post-reform will increase liquidation registrations 
Hypothesis 2b: An increase in lawyers post-reform will not affect bankruptcy registrations 
 
The effect on loss making firms is three-fold. Firstly, we expect “zombie” firms that are making the 
largest losses and have the most debts, for which the lawyers are engaged in litigation, are most likely 
to be dissolved. Secondly, we expect the removal of “zombie” firms should result in an improvement 
in the profitability of other firms.  Thirdly, “zombie” firms that are artificially kept going by yakuza 
intervention will decrease.    
Hypothesis 3: An increase in lawyers post-reform will reduce the number of loss making firms 
 
Finally, the impact of the new lawyers should result in a decrease in the number of crimes where 
yakuza are involved in civil disputes. The increase in the number of lawyers post-reform will reduce 
crimes of extortion and intimidation associated with yakuza intervention in civil disputes. 
 
Hypothesis 4: An increase in lawyers post-reform will reduce extortion and intimidation offences  
 
IV. Results, alternative hypotheses and robustness 
The panel results for the one-off effect of corporate dissolutions and liquidations are based on the 
absolute number of dissolutions relative to the stock of firms. The results in table V show that there is 
a statistically and economically significant increase in the number of both dissolution and liquidation 
registrations in 2004, which is the first full year when a substantial number of judicial scriveners 
gained appearance rights – with 10,000 cases at the Summary Court level where scriveners appeared 
as representatives for either applicant or defendant, see Table III.  
Interestingly it would appear that the impact of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007/8 is reflected in 
another surge of potential loss makers that are resolved by the availability of scriveners with the 
number of dissolutions reaching statistical significance in 2008. In 2008, there are 78,000 cases where 
scriveners represent litigants in Summary Court. It appears possible that the availability of legal 
representation helps to prevent more zombie firms being created in Japan post the Global Financial 
Crisis.  
Overall the relationship between the number of scriveners and both liquidations and dissolutions is 
negative. This negative correlation is likely to be linked to the fact that scriveners operate in 
economically healthier prefectures. However, we find that on a yearly basis we have a statistically 
significant rise in the number of liquidations and dissolutions in 2004. In 2004, the mean impact of the 
number of scriveners per head on dissolutions and liquidations is to increase the number of 
dissolutions and liquidations by 0.8 standard deviations. This is approximately an extra 3550 
dissolutions and 3300 liquidations nationally in 2004.  We thus find support for hypothesis 1: When 
scriveners are given appearance rights this leads to an increase corporate dissolutions and liquidations.  
  
Table V: Year-on-year changes in firm dissolution and liquidation registrations 
 Dissolution/ Firms Liquidations / Firms 
ΔNominal GDPt+1 -0.006 (2.33)** -0.004 (-3.18)** 
Δlawyerst+1 0.006 (3.99)*** 0.004 (3.21)*** 
Scriveners/population -20.1 (-2.07)** -17.25 (-2.39)** 
Attorneys/population 7.31 (3.75)*** -6.81 (4.14***) 
Loss-making firms/ firms 0.001 (0.23) 0.001 (0.24) 
Scrivener/population x 2002 9.87 (1.66) 7.25 (1.76)* 
Scrivener/population x 2003 7.38 (1.46) 5.60 (0.96) 
Scrivener/population x 2004 10.96 (2.45)** 9.70 (2.19)** 
Scrivener/population x 2005 6.31 (1.25) 1.80 (0.40) 
Scrivener/population x 2006 5.63 (1.15) 4.76 (1.15) 
Scrivener/population x 2007 5.89 (1.48) 3.31 (1.02) 
Scrivener/population x 2008 7.63 (2.07)** 3.95 (1.57) 
Scrivener/population x 2009 -1.23 (-0.46) -0.64 (0.19) 
Scrivener/population x 2010 0.22 (0.10) 1.08 (0.40) 
Scrivener/population x 2011 -2.33 (1.18) 1.86 (0.90) 
Constant 0.006 (2.55)** 0.005 (2.78)*** 
Year fixed effects Y Y 
Fixed effects Y Y 
N 517 517 
R
2
 0.39 0.37 
 
 
 
 
 
Year-on-year changes in lawyers 
The year-on-year change in lawyers uses as the primary explanatory independent variable the number 
of lawyers (attorney + scriveners) per head in each prefecture and looks for the lagged effect of the 
change in the number of lawyers on the dependent variables.  
As expected in table VI we find that year-on-year change in lawyers per person does not have a 
statistically significant effect pre-2004, but does become significant at the 1% level post the reform. 
We also find that in the two years after the qualification of a new lawyer, there is a 0.14 decline in the 
percentage of loss making firms. The numbers are statistically significant at the 1% level over one 
year and at the 5% level after two years. Hypotheses 2 and 3 are supported by these results. 
 
 
 
Table VI: Year-on-year changes in firm dissolution, loss making firms pre- and post-reform 
 Pre-2004 Pre-2004 Post-2004 Post-2004 
 ΔDissolution ΔLoss ΔDissolution ΔLoss 
Δlawyerst+1 0.55 (0.63) 0.02 (0.41) 1.15 (2.10)** -0.10 (-2.71)***  
Δlawyerst+2   0.02 (0.20)   -0.14 ( -2.60)** 
Δlawyerst+3     
ΔNominal GDP   0.05 (0.79)   -0.40 (-4.17) *** 
ΔNominal GDPt+1 -1.01 (-1.30) -0.19 (-2.84)*** -0.74 (-2.06)** -0.11 (-1.54) 
Constant -0.04 (-3.63)***  -0.00 (-3.65)*** -0.20 (-7.77)*** 0.00 (1.08) 
FE Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
N 226 141 423 423 
R
2
 0.24 0.36 0.48 0.73 
 
 
 
Putting these numbers into context, a single lawyer represents an approximate 0.14% increase in the 
stock of lawyers for the mean prefecture. This results in an increase of 0.16% in the rate of 
dissolutions per prefecture, which means that the number of dissolutions in the mean prefecture rise 
by 0.66 in the year following a lawyer qualifying. The number of loss-making firms in the mean 
prefecture declines by 0.014% or 5.8 firms in the two years following the qualification of the lawyer. 
Although these numbers may appear low, this is the marginal effect of a single lawyer’s qualification 
and the number of new lawyers qualified between 2004 and 2013 (judicial scriveners with appearance 
rights + Attorneys) is 27,000. We would expect new lawyers to be concentrated in prefectures and 
locales where there is the greatest demand for their services, so the overall effect will not be as great 
at the marginal effect multiplied by the increase in lawyer numbers, but it is clearly significant.  
We expect to find the effect of the new lawyers will be greater for firms undergoing liquidation 
(seisan) rather than bankruptcy (hasan) as bankruptcy is a more expensive procedure and any legal 
resources available are more likely to be directed at the expensive court mandated bankruptcy 
procedure than the cheaper liquidation procedure. Table VII shows that hypotheses 2a and 2b are 
supported and that while bankruptcy is not affected by the number of lawyers, liquidation, post-2004, 
is.  
 
 Table VII: Year-on-year changes in firm bankruptcy and liquidation registrations pre- and 
post-reform 
 Pre-2004 Pre-2004 Post-2004 Post-2004 
 ΔBankruptcy ΔLiquidation ΔBankruptcy ΔLiquidation 
Δlawyerst+1 -0.01 (0.00) -0.22 (-0.21) 0.43 (0.75) 1.01 (1.82)* 
ΔNominal 
GDPt+1 
-1.81 (-0.76) -0.58 (-0.78) -1.29 (-1.91)* -0.65 (-1.84)* 
Constant 0.07 (1.78)*  0.21 (12.73) *** -0.10 (-2.25)** -0.14 (-5.38)*** 
FE Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
N 188 188 423 423 
R
2
 0.07 0.21 0.21 0.21 
 
 
 
Lawyers vs. Yakuza 
The qualification of extra lawyers also has an impact on the yakuza. We expect to find that the new 
lawyers drive the yakuza out of the civil dispute resolution business. Where yakuza engage in civil 
dispute resolution, we expect to find that the actions taken by the yakuza will result in two types of 
crimes: Intimidation and extortion. These are both felonies. Intimidation with compulsion carries a 
maximum sentence of 3 years. Extortion of property is a more serious crime and results in a sentence 
of no more than 10 years. From National Police Agency Data we find that in 2002 38.5% of the 1,572 
arrests for intimidation were of yakuza and that 42.1% of the 2,954 arrests for extortion were of 
yakuza. Note that the regression analysis uses the overall number of offences of extortion and 
intimidation (per head of population) and not the offences committed by yakuza, this information is 
not available on a prefectural basis. We also only have crime data on a prefectural basis from 2000 
rather than 1999, which reduces the pre-reform data.  
In line with our hypothesis 3 in table VIII we find that pre-2004 changes in the number of lawyers per 
head had no statistically significant effect on reported crimes of extortion or intimidation, but post-
2004, we find that an increase in the number of lawyers reduces the number of intimidation offences 
and this result is statistically significant at the 10% level. The effect on extortion is not statistically 
significant at the 10%, but is also negative.  
 
 Table VIII: Year-on-year changes in the number of extortion and intimidation offences pre- and 
post reform 
 Pre-2004 Pre-2004 Post-2004 Post-2004 
 ΔExtortion ΔIntimidation ΔExtortion ΔIntimidation 
Δlawyerst+1 -3.41 (-0.99) 2.00 (0.46) -1.14 (-1.54) -2.14 (-1.89)* 
ΔNominal GDPt+1 1.63 (1.02) -1.26 (-0.43) -1.00 (-1.69)* -0.72 (-0.78) 
Constant 0.07 (1.36) -0.11 (-1.10) -0.15  (-3.23)*** -0.05 (-0.73) 
FE Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
N 141 141 423 423 
R
2
 0.02 0.06 0.08 0.18 
 
 
 
Table IX focuses specifically on 2004, the year that we find the large one-off effect of scriveners 
gaining appearance rights on liquidation filings. We analyse the effect of yakuza presence in different 
prefectures. We expect to find fewer liquidation filings in these locations. We only have data on 
yakuza presence for 2004 for 45 prefectures and do not have sufficient panel data on numbers for 
other years. However, we find that the one-off effect of giving scriveners appearance rights is more 
significant and more positive when we include yakuza and that the presence of yakuza reduces the 
effect of scriveners. In actual numbers the mean percentage of scriveners per head of population in 
2004 is 0.014% and the mean percentage of liquidated firms is 0.51% and the mean percentage of 
yakuza per head of population is 0.059%. In the mean prefecture the effect of judicial scriveners on 
liquidations is thus to increase it by 32% and the effect of the yakuza presence is to decrease it by 
15%.  
 
  
Table IX: Year-on-year changes in the number of liquidation registrations relative to all firms 
in 2004 
 ΔLiquidation ΔLiquidation 
ΔNominal GDPt+1 -3.85 (-2.84)*** -4.36 (-2.99)*** 
Scrivener/population 1958.35 (2.19)** 2352.05 (2.50)** 
Attorneys/Population -325.36 (-1.78)* -28.49 (-0.21) 
Yakuza/population   -256.09 (-1.76)* 
Constant -0.31 (-3.08)*** -0.28 (-3.22)*** 
N 47 45 
R
2
 0.26 0.35 
 
 
 
Alternative hypotheses 
There are two other factors that clearly can be expected to have an effect on corporate failures and 
yakuza activity. The first is the impact of bank lending. The financial fragility of the banking sector 
and evergreening of loans is seen to be a major cause of “zombie” firms. The second factor is changes 
in the number of policemen, which would be expected to affect yakuza activity. The aggregate 
number of policemen in Japan increases during this period. This coincides with a more active anti-
yakuza policy, with police and judicial authorities pursuing policies designed to reduce revenues of 
yakuza.  
To control for the effect of bank lending, we re-run regressions on corporate dissolutions, liquidations 
and loss making firms while including changes in bank lending. We use both a lagged value and a 
current value for bank lending. The results in Table X show that the bank lending variable is 
statistically significant and at the same time there is no change in the coefficients for the year-on-year 
change in the number of lawyers’ impact on dissolution, loss making firms and liquidations.  
 
  
 Table X: Year-on-year changes in firm dissolution and liquidation registrations and in the 
number of loss making firms post-reform 
 Post-2004 Post-2004 Post-2004 
 ΔDissolution ΔLoss ΔLiquidation 
Δlawyerst+1 1.17 (2.19) ** -0.09 (-2.39)** 1.04 (1.98)* 
Δlawyerst+2   -0.13 (-2.49)**   
ΔBank loans -0.71 (-2.44)** -0.11 (-3.17)*** -0.78 (-2.52)** 
ΔBank loanst+1 -0.02 (-0.10) 0.12 (1.68)* 0.10 (0.31)  
ΔNominal GDP   -0.38 (-4.63)***   
ΔNominal GDPt+1 -0.73 (-1.99)* -0.12 (-1.58) -0.66 (-1.84)* 
Constant -0.20 (-7.67)***  0.00 (1.04) -0.14 (-5.36)*** 
FE Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
N 423 423 423 
R
2
 0.48 0.75 0.22 
 
 
 
The relative importance of the bank lending channel and the lawyers can be compared using the mean 
year-on-year change in bank lending and lawyers post-2004. Mean bank lending growth was 1.06%, 
with a standard deviation of 3.25%, while growth in lawyers was a mean 3.13% with a standard 
deviation of 2.28%. For dissolutions, the mean effect of lawyers is thus 3.66% and the mean effect of 
bank lending is -0.75%. For loss making firms, the mean effect of lawyers is 0.41% and the mean 
effect of bank lending is 0.1%. For liquidations, the mean effect of lawyers is 3.25% and of bank 
lending is -0.83%. Clearly the effect of variation in bank lending, which has a higher standard 
deviation will have a greater effect, but in aggregate the change in the number of lawyers appears to 
be more significant than changes in bank lending.  
The second alternate hypothesis is that changes in the number of policemen affect the yakuza’s ability 
to engage in civil dispute intercession. We re-run regressions on the post-2004 cases of intimidation 
and extortion while including the change in the number of policemen per head as an independent 
variable.  Table XI shows that the inclusion of policemen does not alter the coefficients on the impact 
of lawyers. If we include both police and bank lending growth in regressions for extortion and 
intimidation we find that bank lending increases both intimidation and extortion, which is statistically 
significant for intimidation, but not for extortion. Including both bank lending and police in the 
regression increases the explanatory power of the increase in lawyers, with the increase in lawyers 
statistically significant at the 10% level for extortion and statistically significant at the 5% level for 
intimidation.  
 
Table XI: Year-on-year changes in the number of extortion and intimidation offences post 
reform 
 Post-2004 Post-2004 Post-2004 Post-2004 
 ΔExtortion ΔIntimidation ΔExtortion ΔIntimidation 
Δlawyerst+1 -1.14 (-1.57) -2.17 (-1.92)* -1.22 (1.68)* -2.24 (-2.03)** 
Δpolicet+1 -0.63 (-0.49) -2.59 (-1.52) -0.93 (-0.71) -2.79 (-1.72)* 
ΔBank loans   0.75 (1.01) 1.88 (2.26)** 
ΔBank loanst+1   -1.00 (-1.50) -0.13 (-0.21) 
ΔNominal 
GDPt+1 
-1.04 (-1.70)* -0.89 (-0.99) -0.98 (-1.55) -0.91 (-0.99) 
Constant -0.15  (-3.21)*** -0.04 (-0.51) -0.14 (-3.11)*** -0.04 (-0.58) 
FE Y Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y Y 
N 423 423 423 423 
R
2
 0.08 0.18 0.09 0.19 
 
 
Further robustness tests 
We consider the possibility that another anti-yakuza factor explains the reduction in intimidation and 
extortion offences that may be correlated with lawyers, but is not caused by them. We hypothesize 
such a factor would also affect other crimes associated with the yakuza. In 2002, yakuza were 
responsible for 21% of homicide arrests (299 arrests), 38% of drug offence arrests (7124 arrests) and 
15.7% of robbery arrests (652 arrests). If the growth in lawyers is correlated with another factor that is 
impeding the yakuza’s activities we would expect to see an impact of new lawyer creation on these 
other crimes for which the yakuza are significantly responsible. We include the other explanatory 
factors such as bank lending, police and nominal GDP growth. We find that the growth in lawyers is 
not associated with declines in arrests for these three major crimes that are associated with the 
yakuza’s non-civil dispute resolution activities in table XII.  
Table XII: Year-on-year changes in the number of drugs, homicide and robbery offences pre- 
and post reform 
 Post-2004 Post-2004 Post-2004 
 ΔDrugs ΔHomicides ΔRobberies 
Δlawyerst+1 -0.10 (-0.14) -1.52 (-0.86)  -0.34 (-0.29) 
Δpolicet+1 -0.44 (-0.34) -2.07 (-0.97) 0.93 (0.67) 
ΔBank loans -0.30 (-0.53) 1.96 (1.94)* 0.44 (0.77) 
ΔBank loanst+1 0.24 (0.49)  -0.62 (-0.45) -0.72 (-1.16) 
ΔNominal 
GDPt+1 
-1.21 (-0.99) -1.00 (-0.57) 0.63 (0.55) 
Constant -0.02 (-0.52) 0.13 (0.97) -0.08 (-1.05) 
FE Y Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y Y 
N 423 423 423 
R
2
 0.35 0.05 0.03 
 
 
Effect on growth 
The removal of loss making “zombie” firms will have a medium term positive impact on aggregate 
growth, but in the short term should result in less growth as jobs are lost and existing business 
relationships are disrupted. Given the decline in number of loss-making “zombie” firms for two years 
post-new lawyer qualification, it is logical to assume that positive effects on economic activity may 
not be apparent until three years post-qualification. As shown in table XIII, post the legal reforms, the 
effect of new lawyer qualification on economic growth is positive and statistically significant at the 
10% level three years post lawyer qualification. In the period post-2004, the mean growth of GDP per 
capita was 0.97% with a standard deviation of 3.1%. The growth rate of lawyers per capita was 3.1%, 
meaning that the effect of mean lawyer qualifications was about 0.28% or approximately 29% of 
mean growth.  
 
  
 Table XIII: Year-on-year changes in prefectural GDP per capita pre- and post reform 
 Pre-2004 Post-2004 
 ΔGDP per capita ΔGDP per capita 
Δlawyerst+1 -0.15 (-0.94) -0.02 (-0.40) 
Δlawyerst+2 -0.3 (-0.16) 0.00. (0.10) 
Δlawyerst+3 0.09 (0.63) 0.09 (1.75)* 
GDP per capitat+1 -0.20 (-4.62)*** -0.09 (-4.85)*** 
Constant 0.71 (4.73)*** 0.36 (5.05)*** 
FE Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
N 94 423 
R
2
 0.00 0.09 
 
 
 
V. Conclusion 
The widening of appearance rights to judicial scriveners and the acceleration in numbers of lawyers 
qualified post-2002 appears to have had significant and positive effects on the Japanese economy. The 
one-off approval of appearance rights for scriveners appears to have increased the number of 
dissolutions and liquidations by approximately 20%. The creation of extra lawyers appears to have 
been helpful in overcoming a logjam of “zombie” firms created by the bursting of the “bubble” 
economy and subsequent bank bust and helped to clear problems associated with the global financial 
crisis of 2007-8. However, in line with Ramseyer’s (1988) view that the Japanese are rational 
litigants, we find that the number of new cases filed have decreased in recent years, although the rate 
at which Alternative Dispute Resolution occurs has fallen by less, which supports the view that the 
Japanese are rational litigants. The Japanese Federation of Bar Associations announced that the mean 
income of Japanese attorneys fell to ¥9 million (US$ 82,500) in 2014 from ¥17.5 million (US$ 
160,000) in 2006.
8
 These results contrast with the findings of Mora-Sanguinetti and Garoupa (2015), 
who find that new lawyers induce more litigation in Spain. The complaints of the Japan Federation of 
Bar Associations that the salaries of Japanese attorneys has fallen should not be seen as an indicator 
that the policy of reform has failed, but instead an indicator that the policy has succeeded. The 
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 Obe (2016) 
increase in lawyers has not led to a surge in litigation after the “zombies” are closed, and so the costs 
of rent seeking by lawyers does not appear to have increased due to the increase in supply of lawyers.  
We believe that the results of this study are more widely applicable even though it is based on Japan. 
Firstly, we believe it supports moves towards the provision of more and cheaper legal services in 
developed countries. Secondly, it clearly shows that the lack of legal services can have serious 
negative implications for economic growth, something that support the view put forward by Gilson 
(1992) that the role of lawyers need not be just to engage in rent seeking activities. Thirdly, it lends 
further support to the view that in countries with weaker institutions, when booms end, there may be a 
need for legal reforms to promote recovery (see Claessens et al. 2002). Finally, it gives insights into 
the role played by organized crime in civil disputes and shows that countries in transition with large 
organized crime sectors can shift to a new equilibrium without “dark side” private ordering.  
It should be noted that our results do not give a definitive answer about the optimal number of 
lawyers. Japan still has far fewer lawyers than the number that Magee (1992) identified as optimal: 
one per 730 persons, even including scriveners with judicial appearance rights Japan has one for every 
2,600 persons. The availability of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms / private ordering can 
substitute for legal services, as had been the case in Japan prior to the financial crisis and means that 
fewer lawyers per person are necessary. The failure of the previous equilibrium due to changing inter-
firm credit and financially distressed banks leads to a rise in “dark side” private ordering – yakuza – 
which is undesirable and contributes to a rise in “zombie” firms. It is in this environment that a 
significant increase in the number of lawyers is necessary to resolve financial distress. This shows that 
the optimum number of lawyers is dependent on the context. 
Even in the US, which is seen to be suffering from an excess of lawyers, we find a perceived shortage 
of lawyers for small and medium sized businesses. President Obama called for a (cheaper) two-year 
law degree and academics and policy makers have called for the licensing of Limited License Legal 
Technicians (LLLTs). LLLTs are legal in Washington State as of September 2012. This matches the 
way in which judicial scriveners appear to have played a major role in providing low cost legal 
services, litigating in Summary Courts for relatively small sums, helping to close down loss making 
firms and promoting efficiency. Judicial scriveners running their own offices made a mean reported
9
 
pre-tax income of ¥4.7 million (US$43,000) about half the reported level of attorneys.  
  
                                                          
9
 2013 White Paper on Judicial Scriveners 
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Appendix 
 
Table A. Attorneys and judicial scriveners by prefecture 2002 and 2013 
Prefecture Attorneys 
(2002) 
Attorneys 
(2013) 
Scriveners 
(2002) 
Scriveners 
(2013) 
Attorney 
change 
2013/2002 
Attorneys 
per 1000 
pop 2002 
Lawyers  per 
1000 pop 
2013 
Ratio of 
scriveners to 
attorneys 2002 
Aichi 891 1,701 830 1,221 91% 12% 39% 93% 
Akita 49 78 153 115 59% 4% 18% 312% 
Aomori 42 118 138 125 181% 3% 18% 329% 
Chiba 302 673 513 680 123% 5% 22% 170% 
Ehime 91 159 263 250 75% 6% 29% 289% 
Fukui 43 99 136 132 130% 5% 29% 316% 
Fukuoka 626 1,091 705 904 74% 12% 39% 113% 
Fukushima 86 176 298 279 105% 4% 23% 347% 
Gifu 91 180 332 349 98% 4% 26% 365% 
Gunma 128 264 277 305 106% 6% 29% 216% 
Hiroshima 275 528 430 504 92% 10% 36% 156% 
Hokkaido 414 887 560 653 114% 7% 28% 135% 
Hyogo 437 814 787 1,019 86% 8% 33% 180% 
Ibaraki 101 249 277 318 147% 3% 19% 274% 
Ishikawa 86 167 184 195 94% 7% 31% 214% 
Iwate 46 99 175 156 115% 3% 20% 380% 
Kagawa 84 163 170 169 94% 8% 34% 202% 
Kagoshima 83 183 300 321 120% 5% 30% 361% 
Kanagawa 750 1,424 677 1,081 90% 9% 28% 90% 
Kochi 55 87 133 116 58% 7% 27% 242% 
Kumamoto 111 247 322 325 123% 6% 32% 290% 
Kyoto 359 667 414 559 86% 14% 47% 115% 
Mie  73 172 261 266 136% 4% 24% 358% 
Miyagi 225 409 266 315 82% 9% 31% 118% 
Miyazaki 57 123 175 177 116% 5% 27% 307% 
Nagano 114 230 353 376 102% 5% 29% 310% 
Nagasaki 75 157 164 161 109% 5% 23% 219% 
Nara 86 158 169 217 84% 6% 27% 197% 
Niigata 128 251 318 290 96% 5% 23% 248% 
Oita 69 140 179 171 103% 6% 26% 259% 
Okayama 176 354 302 362 101% 9% 37% 172% 
Okinawa 178 248 218 218 39% 13% 33% 122% 
Osaka 2,713 4,136 1,698 2,278 52% 31% 72% 63% 
Saga 38 95 117 115 150% 4% 25% 308% 
Saitama 321 725 623 829 126% 5% 22% 194% 
Shiga 49 140 162 218 186% 4% 25% 331% 
Shimane 23 69 147 122 200% 3% 27% 639% 
Shizuoka 222 421 400 485 90% 6% 24% 180% 
Tochigi 96 196 217 224 104% 5% 21% 226% 
Tokushima 49 91 168 138 86% 6% 30% 343% 
Tokyo 9,349 16,276 2,276 3,663 74% 76% 150% 24% 
Tottori 24 68 115 107 183% 4% 30% 479% 
Toyama 51 102 157 170 100% 5% 25% 308% 
Wakayama 70 141 164 168 101% 7% 32% 234% 
Yamagata 52 90 185 155 73% 4% 21% 356% 
Yamaguchi 76 150 256 238 97% 5% 27% 337% 
Yamanashi 58 117 140 127 102% 7% 29% 241% 
National 19,522 35,113 17,304 21,366 80% 15% 44% 89% 
Source: Japan Federation of Bar Associations, Japan Association of Shiho Shoshi Associations, National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
 
 Table B: Year-on-year change in number of loss making firms pre-reform 
 Pre-2004 Pre-2004 
 ΔLoss ΔLoss 
ΔIntimidationt+1 0.01 (1.71)*  
ΔExtortiont+1  -0.00 (-0.41) 
ΔLawyerst+1 0.03 (0.29) 0.06 (0.50) 
ΔPolicet+1 -0.01 (-0.47) -0.01 (-0.19) 
ΔBank loans 0.06 (0.68) 0.08 (0.81) 
ΔBank loanst+1 0.10 (1.36)  0.09 (1.19) 
ΔNominal GDPt+1 -0.30 (3.53)*** -0.31 (3.35)*** 
Constant -0.00 (-0.17) -0.00 (-0.41) 
FE Y Y 
Year dummies Y Y 
N 94 94 
R
2
 0.56 0.53 
 
 
 
Table C: Japanese attorneys’ median and mean earnings in millions of Yen 
 
Median Mean 
2000 13 17 
2004 12 16.5 
2006 12 16.3 
2008 11 16 
2010 9.93 15.7 
2014 6 9.07 
Source: Japan Federation of Bar Associations 
NB. Table C overstates the decline in attorney earnings since the composition of attorneys has changed since reforms began. 
The relative percentage of younger and less experienced attorneys skews both the mean and median downward. 
 
